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The demand for computing power and storage is increasing continuously and there are 
applications like scientific research and industrial need, whose computational demand 
even exceeds the available fastest technologies. As a result it is an economically feasible 
mean to look into efficiently aggregate existing distributed resources. To achieving this 
goal makes it possible to build a shared large scale wide-area distributed computing 
infrastructure, a concept which has been named the Grid computing. The primary 
objective of Grid computing is to support the sharing of resources and service spanning 
across multiple administrative domains. Due to the inherently dynamic and multi 
organizational nature maintaining security of both users and resources is the challenging 
aspect of Grid. Grid uses internet as an infrastructure to build communication, with the 
fusion of web services and grid technologies further increases the security concerns for 
their complex nature. 
This thesis takes a look at the vulnerability of Grid environment on denial of 
service attack. We found that deploying an efficient intrusion detection system to Grid 
can significantly improve its security and it can detect denial of service attack before it 
affects the victim. But due to the special characteristics and requirement of Grids, the 
existing traditional intrusion detection system can not work properly in that environment. 
The focus of this thesis is to investigate and design an anomaly detection system which 
can detect DoS and DDoS attack with high attack detection and low false alarm rate to 
achieve high performance. We have extensively surveyed the current literatures in this 
area; the main stress is put on feature selection for the Grid based anomaly detection 
system. An entropy based anomaly detection system has been proposed; also we have 
discussed the advantage of taking entropy as the metric. Finally the performance of the 
system has been analyzed using NS2 network simulator. 
For shake of continuity each chapter has its relevant introduction and theory. The 
work is also supported by list of necessary references. Attempt is made to make the thesis 
self-content. 
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The availability of low cost powerful computers with the popularity of the internet and 
high speed networks have led the computing technology evolved from classical 
distributed system to Grid environment. The Grid computing is rapidly growing as a 
dominant field of high throughput wide area distributed computing. Its objective is to 
provide a service oriented infrastructure that supports the sharing and coordinated use of 
heterogeneous resources spread across multiple administrative domains that are not 
subject to any centralized control [1, 2]. Now a variety of middleware systems are 
available that enable resource providers to make available their resources for use by 
others in Grid. By combining distributed resources Grid forms an image of a single 
virtual system through which users from different places can access shared resources in 
an efficient manner. Unlike where internet focuses on communication among devices, 
Grid computing is seen as a network of computation. The term “Grid” was introduced in 
early 1998 with the launch of the book “The Grid: Blueprint for a new computing 
infrastructure” (Ian Foster, Carl Kesselman). This defined “Grid computing is a hardware 
and software infrastructure that provides dependable, consistent, pervasive, and 
inexpensive access to high end computational capabilities”. [1]  
The name 'Grid' comes from analogy with the Electricity Grid. Users can obtain a 
resource such as electricity, or in this case computer processing from a variety of sources 
to supply their needs. The goal is to provide users with access to the resources they need 
and when they need them. Initially Grid systems were developed for supporting scientific 
computations. Today, many enterprises and researchers are looking to use the Grid 
approach to commercial uses and for applications in many different areas. Security in 
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Grid systems however has not been much addressed and yet is an important issue to make      
it usable in a variety of commercial applications.  
1.1 Motivation  
In Grid environments, where the computational, storage, and network resources are 
inherently heterogeneous, dynamic and multi organizational in nature, the issue of 
managing security of both resources and users are most challenging. Although Grid 
Security Infrastructure (GSI) of grid middleware provides several security features that 
required on grid environment; include X.509 certificates, authentication algorithm using 
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol, authorization, delegation, auditing and single sign 
on [11]. An intruder can explore security flaws in any of the other components like 
operating system (OS), network protocols and non grid application running in the same 
environment. Moreover grid cannot defend itself against stolen passwords and 
legitimated users who abuse their privileges to execute malicious activities and due to the 
huge resource capacity like computational and storage, grid may become a next platform 
for the attackers [24]. If an intruder got unauthorized access to grid, the grid resources 
can misused in different ways; like the huge computational power can be used for 
breaking passwords or security systems , the large storage capacity can be used to store 
illegal software , data and the huge bandwidth can be used for lunching Distributed 
Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. Possible security threats associated in grid are 
discussed in section (2.8), out of which Denial of Service attack (DoS) and Distributed 
Denial of Service attacks (DDoS) [23] are the most common and deadly attack today. 
Intrusion detection system (IDS) are widely used for detection of Denial of 
Service attack in a network or with in a system and it can be deployed in grid to 
complement existing measures like authentication, authorization, access control [23]. 
Along with those basic security measures Grid-specific Intrusion Detection System is 
capable of functioning in a real-life grid environment, which has the potential to detect 
before Denial of Service attack succeeds. The purpose of this research is to designing an 
anomaly detection system for detecting real-life grid misuse. 
Introduction 
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1.2 Problem Statement and objectives 
As the users of the grid are from a number of different real organizations, each 
organization may have different access policies and security mechanism. These 
organizations share their resources collectively as grid which is in the form of a larger 
dynamic virtual organization (VO). Maintaining security in such an environment is a real 
challenge and most difficult part in security management of large high speed networks 
like grid is the detection of suspicious anomalies in network traffic patterns due to DoS 
and DDoS attacks. 
To secure grid from DoS attack its must be detected before it affects the end user 
with high detection rate and low false alarm rate, So that attack traffic will be discarded, 
without affecting legitimate traffic. In case of DDoS attack, the attack packets comes 
from ten or thousand of sources and DoS defense system that is based upon monitoring 
the volume of packets coming from a single address or single network will fail since the 
attack comes from various sources. Intrusion detection systems [8] are widely used for 
DDoS attack detection. An intrusion detection system (IDS) inspects all inbound and 
outbound network and system activity and identifies possible security threats in a 
network or in a system. IDSs can be classified, based on their functionality, as misuse 
detectors and anomaly detectors [23]. Anomaly detection has an advantage over 
signature-based is that a new attack can be detected if it falls out of the normal traffic 
patterns. Due to the special characteristics and requirement of computational grids, 
detecting such difference in traffic patterns imposed some new unique challenges that did 
not exist in traditional intrusion detection system. One of the properties of Grid Security 
Infrastructure (GSI) [11] is the confidentiality of the data transferred over the network. 
For which the data transmitted over the grid must be encrypted and the system could not 
see the data payload portion of the packet because of encryption. Analysis would be 
based only on the low level information, which can be extracted from the packet header. 
The Next problem is to find a metric that can extract distribution of traffic features that 
can be used in anomaly detection system.  
 Accordingly we identify the objective of the thesis and list them as follows 
Introduction 
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• To study different possible security threats in grid. 
• To investigate how DoS attack affect the grid performance. 
•  To investigate which metrics can be suitable for designing anomaly detection 
system for grid. 
• To propose an anomaly detection algorithm for grid. 
• To study the performance of the above algorithm through simulation.  
1.3 Contribution 
We found that DoS and DDoS attacks are major threats to the grid performance. The 
perfect secure system for DDoS attack can be divided in to 3 steps: (i) Attack 
prevention, (ii) attack detection and recovery, and (iii) attack identification. In thesis 
we emphasized to detect and stop DDoS attacks with in the intermediate network 
before affecting the victim. After surveying a lot of literature we found that entropy 
can be taken as a suitable metric for designing an anomaly detection system for 
detecting DDoS attack in grid environment. In section (4) we discussed our proposed 
entropy based Grid specific anomaly detection system. Finally using NS-2 network 
simulator [10] we evaluate the performance results. 
1.4 Organization of the Thesis 
The rest of the thesis divided into the fallowing Chapters.  
Chapter-2 It starts by giving an overview of grid and its architecture .It then describes 
basic security requirements and technology used in grid. Finally a threat classification 
model for grid has been presented.  
Chapter-3 Discusses related work has been done to protect grid from DoS attack and 
intrusion detection system for grid. This chapter also explains in details the DoS and 
DDoS characteristics and the three steps used in DoS defense system.    
Introduction 
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Chapter-4 Explains the proposed entropy based anomaly detection system (ADS) for 
grid environment. Finally using a grid topology model the implementation details of the 
proposed algorithm has been presented.   
Chapter -5 presents the experimental setup for validation of the proposed system using 
NS2 simulator and fallowed by simulation results.  
Chapter -6 concludes this thesis with a discussion about future direction. Reference 
section includes detail list of necessary references used in this thesis. 
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This Chapter presents the concepts underlying this thesis and the necessary materials for 
understanding the rest of the thesis. The presentation here consists of three parts. The first 
part introduces the basic concept about Grid technology and its architecture. The second 
part discusses the security requirements and technology used in grid. Finally, the threats 
classifications in grid are discussed. 
2.1 Need of grid Computing 
The basic idea of grid computing is to provide an infrastructure for solving massive 
computational problems by using the idle resources (CPU cycles, disk storage, and 
network bandwidth) of large number of computers, servers embedded in a distributed 
infrastructure. The aim is getting computers to work together for solving a particular 
problem. In every organization, there are large amounts of underutilized computing 
resources. According to IBM survey Mainframes are idle 40% of the time, UNIX servers 
are actually "serving" something less than 10% of the time and most desktop machines 
are busy less than 5 percent of the time .[2]  
Grid computing provides a framework for exploiting these underutilized resources 
to solve problems which are beyond the scope of single processor and also increases the 
efficiency of resource usage. [2] In addition to scientific experiment, industries such as 
bio-medical field, modeling, oil exploration, motion picture animation, weather 
prediction and many others needs massive computing power. In grid environment a 
single large job can be split into smaller pieces and run on several computers 
simultaneously which is too intensive for any stand alone machine. 
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2.2 Types of grids  
Grid computing can be used in a variety of ways to address various kinds of application 
requirements. Often, grids are categorized by the type of solutions that they provide. The 
three primary types of grids are summarized below. [9] 
Computational grid 
A computational grid provides secure access to huge pool of shared processing power 
suitable for high throughput applications and computation intensive computing. It 
focused on specifically for computing power. Computational Grid also called Meta 
computer. Examples of computational Grid include NSF TeraGrid  and SETI@home. 
Data grid 
Data grids provide an infrastructure to support data storage, data discovery, data 
handling, data publication, and data manipulation of large volumes of data stored in 
heterogeneous databases and file systems across multiple organizations. Different 
datasets stored in different locations create an illusion of mass storage. These are often, 
but not always, combined with computational grid systems.  
Service grid 
In service grid unused resources are exported to the users in the form of service. It creates 
a "grid" from the unused resources in a network of participants. With the evolve of open 
grid architecture (OGSA), open and standard protocols it provides services and supports 
dynamic creating, running, maintaining and cancellation of application. The QOS is an 
important parameter for a service grid system to meet the user demand.  
2.3 Grid applications 
Based on types of applications of grid it can be divided in to four types like on demand 
computing, high through computing, data intensive computing and collaborative 
computing. 
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2.3.1 On Demand Computing 
On-demand computing is an increasingly popular enterprise model in which computing 
resources are made available to the user as needed [15]. Maintaining sufficient resources 
locally to meet peek requirements can be costly, On-demand applications use grid 
capabilities to meet short-term requirements in peak time. These resources may be 
computation, software, data repositories, and special scientific equipments. Computer 
Associates, HP, IBM, Microsoft, and Sun Microsystems are among the more prominent 
on-demand vendors. Sun launches Sun Grid, now anyone in the U.S. can get flexible, 
metered access to enormous computing power over the network for the affordable price 
of $1/CPU-hr. [13] 
2.3.1 High-Throughput Computing 
In high-throughput computing, the grid is used to schedule large numbers of independent 
tasks, with the goal of utilizing unused processor cycles of ideal machines. Many 
scientific experiments are needed massive CPU power and they are strongly related to 
computing throughput so grid is used as high throughput computing in this case. For 
example The Condor [14] system from the University of Wisconsin-Madison is used to 
manage large collections of distributive owned heterogeneous computing resources 
around the world which is used for research purposes. 
2.3.2 Data intensive computing 
Data intensive computing is concerned with capturing, analyzing, managing large volume 
of data, which is maintained in geographically distributed repositories, digital libraries, 
and databases. Such data intensive applications exist on different areas like scientific 
research, cyber security, animation and business field. Also data-intensive applications 
require high degrees of fault-tolerance, reliability, and availability. Using data intensive 
computing rather only  collect, analyze and store massive amounts of information, 
researchers are able to getting experimental results more rapidly and thoroughly .For 
example, Google runs an average of 100,000 Map Reduce jobs per day on its clusters, 
processing over 20 pet bytes data daily. 
The Grid and Security Concerns 
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2.3.3 Collaborative Computing 
It provides an ability to allow geographically distributed teams to develop, share and 
utilize common resources. Sharing is not limited to data, but also includes many other 
resources, such as scientific equipments, software, services, and licenses. These 
applications are often structured in terms of a virtual shared space to give a uniform 
interoperability among heterogeneous grid participants. With existing collaboration tools 
grids provide an infrastructure within which distributed users share computing tasks, 
analyses, and visualization results in the form of a collaborating computing. For example 
Persons from different companies in a virtual enterprise can work on different 
components of a CAD project without even disclosing their work using the grid. 
2.4 Grid components 
Grid basically contains five Components. 
1. A portal 
2. A service broker 
3. Task scheduler 
4. A task manager 
5. A group of grid node. 
The portal acts as a user interface, through which user can log in and use the grid. After 
having logged into the grid, a user can submit a task. 
The service broker identifies the list of resources for handling a particular task 
submitted by the user and selects the optimal one which is available now. 
A scheduler sets rules and priorities for scheduling jobs on a grid-based infrastructure. It 
is responsible for scheduling submitted tasks. 
The task manager finally launches a submitted task. 
The Grid and Security Concerns 
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The nodes can be desktops, servers, Workstations and clusters that belong to different 
LANs, WANs, or the Internet.  
2.5 Steps of Task execution in grid 
This grid VO model in figure 2.1 depicts typical steps of how grid jobs are submitted and 
executed. 
User
Resource  
Broker
Grid portal
ResourcesGrid Information    
center
Grid scheduler
Grid task  
Manager R
egis
trat
ion
 
Figure 2.1: Task execution in Grid 
1) A user log in to the grid through a portal, the portal acts as a user interface, through 
which user can log in and use the grid. After identification verification of the user he/she 
can submit its task to the task manager. 
2) The task manager cooperates with information center, which maintains the list of 
available resources and resource broker, which identifies the list of resources which can 
satisfy a particular task submitted by the user.  
3) Next the scheduler is responsible for scheduling submitted tasks on the resources 
identified by resource broker, Which Sets rules and priorities for scheduling task on a 
grid infrastructure.  
The Grid and Security Concerns 
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4) Job manager supplies the user task, data to the selected resources and after execution 
of the task it returns the computed result to the user. 
2.6 Grid architecture 
Grid architecture identifies fundamental system components, specifies the purpose and 
function of these components, and indicates how these components interact with one 
another. [3] A computational grid can be modeled using 4-layer architecture as (1) Grid 
fabric, (2) Core Grid Middleware, (3) Grid Tools, and (4) Grid Fabric. As shown in 
figure 2.2 [4] 
                          
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Block Diagram of Computational Grid 
Grid Fabric is consists of all the globally distributed resources that are accessible from 
anywhere on the Internet. The Fabric Layer includes the local protocols and interfaces for 
accessing and managing the local resources. Possible resources could be computers (such 
as PCs, clusters) with variety of operating systems (such as UNIX or Windows) as well 
as resource management systems such as LSF (Load Sharing Facility), Condor, 
PBS(Portable Batch System) or SGE (Sun Grid Engine), storage  systems  devices, 
databases, programs ,networks and special scientific instruments such as a radio 
telescope.  
The Core Grid Middleware offers core services such as remote process management, 
co-allocation of resources, storage access, information registration and discovery, 
security and aspects of Quality of Service (QOS) such as resource reservation and 
Grid Applications 
Grid Tools 
Grid Middleware 
Grid Fabric 
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trading. These services abstract the complexity and heterogeneity method of accessing 
distributed resources. 
The Grid Tools (User-Level Grid Middleware) includes application development 
environments, programming tools, and resource brokers for managing resources and 
scheduling application tasks for execution on global resources.  
Application layer is the highest layer of the structure that grid users "see" and interact 
with. The application layer is often called serviceware. Grid applications are typically 
developed using grid-enabled languages and interfaces and brokering and scheduling 
services provided by grid tools or user level middleware. Applications may be in science, 
engineering, business, finance and more. Grid portals offer Web-enabled application 
services, where the users can submit and collect results for their jobs on remote resources 
through the Web.  
2.7 Grid Security 
Generally first generation grid was deployed across mutually trusting administrative 
domains like research laboratories, academic institutions and for military use, But OGSA 
(Open Grid Services Architecture) [5] as a standard for interoperable next-generation 
grids, many commercial enterprises are beginning to use grid technologies as well [13]. 
As grid is being used commercially, maintaining the QoS, level of security demand by 
users and resource security, resource integrity, confidentiality of communication, privacy 
of user information are prime concerns. Grid security itself imposes several unique 
security challenges, including managing user identities across local and global networks, 
trust relationships between entities, end-user key and credential management, and 
providing security to resources against malicious acts from grid users. [9] The fusion of 
web services and grid technologies further increases the concerns about security problem 
for their complex nature [16]. Security is a very important component of the Grid, as 
misuse of its vast resources can result in considerate damage. 
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Basic security requirement and technologies in grid 
Any system’s security goal is to provide easy access to legitimate users and to prevent 
users who don’t have the proper privileges from accessing resources and information. 
This section presents the traditional security areas that play an important role in defining 
security for grid and the associated technologies. [12] 
                              
Figure 2.3: Typical grid Scenario 
2.7.1 Authentication 
Grid security requirements should contain authentication mechanisms at the entry points. 
Authentication deals with verification of the identity of an entity with in a network. An 
entity may be a user, a resource provider or service provider. The main requirements for 
authentication include scalability, trust across different Certification Authorities and 
timeliness of revocation. It is possible to have different authentication mechanisms for 
different sites within a grid. Therefore, the security protocol should be flexible and 
scalable to handle all the different requirements and provide a seamless interface to the 
user. 
The most prevalent mechanisms of authentication in a GSI (Grid Security 
Infrastructure) based grid is Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), which defines message 
formats and protocols that allow entities to securely communicate claims and statements . 
The most widely used certificate format in PKI is X.509. In this PKI, highly trusted 
     
Authentication SITE A 
 SITE B 
 
SITE D 
 
Entry 
Point 
  Confidentiality 
   Integrity 
Single sign on 
 
 SITE C 
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entities know as certificate authorities (CA) issue X.509 certificates where essentially a 
unique identity name and the public key of an entity are bound through the digital 
signature of that CA. In addition to certificate based mechanism, Kerberos and can either 
be a peer-to-peer relationship such as a password that only the client and the server know 
have also been implemented . 
2.7.2 Authorization 
After authentication, the second most fundamental challenge to security in a 
computational grid is authorization. Once the identity of a user can be established, it is 
then necessary to determine the permission of that user to use a particular resource. 
Authorization ensures that every authenticated user can only access the resources that he 
or she is allowed to. Thus authorization is closely related to access control trust. 
There are several technologies used for handling authorization in grid 
environment. One of the widely used technologies was in the form of globus toolkit grid 
map file. [11] This is a text file that holds the list of the X.500 distinguished name of the 
grid users and the equivalent local user account names that they are to be mapped into. 
This must be installed and maintained on each participating host. The Community 
Authorization Service (CAS) was the next attempt by the Globus to improve the user 
authorization. CAS allows a resource owner to grant access to a portion of his/her 
resource to a VO and then let the community determine who can use this allocation. The 
US fusion grid project [8] used resource oriented authorization manager (ROAM) for 
simplifying the process of requesting, viewing and granting authorization. 
2.7.3 Delegation and Single Sign-on 
A single computation may require access to many resources and many times, but 
requiring a user to re authenticate on each occasion is impractical and generally 
unacceptable. Instead, a user should be able to authenticate once and then assign to the 
computation the right to operate on his or her behalf, typically for a specified period. This 
capability is achieved through the creation of a proxy credential [15] .The GSI provides 
single sign-on and delegation capabilities by creating a proxy consisting of a new 
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certificate (with a new public key in it) and a new private key. The new certificate 
contains the owner’s identity, modified slightly to indicate that it’s a proxy. The owner, 
rather than the CA, signs the new certificate, which also includes a time notation after 
which others should no longer accept the proxy. Another very important requirement for 
a grid-based security system is delegation. In a Grid, a user may need to ask an entity to 
perform an operation on his/her behalf. For example, a scheduler may need to query an 
information service to determine on which machines a user is allowed to and has enough 
allocation to execute a job. The scheduler does not have the privilege to ask the 
information service directly, because the information service protects its potentially 
proprietary information from unauthorized access. The information service would 
provide a user’s information to a scheduler if it was acting on that user’s behalf. That’s 
the reason why delegation comes to the reality. Delegation is the technique that an entity 
could be asked to perform some operations on that user’s behalf. To simplify the process 
even further, proxy certificates are also used for delegation. [15] 
2.7.4 Secure Communication  
Secure communication provides the ability for two or more entities to conduct a 
conversation with integrity, confidentiality and non- repudiation data communication. 
Depending upon on the layer where security is implemented there is two categories of 
security mechanism, transport level security and message level security. GT4 implements 
transport security using a Secure Socket Layer (SSL) implementation, which provides the 
security properties. As an alternative, GT4 uses message-level security (MLS) to 
implement encryption, authentication, and integrity mechanisms at the message layer, 
rather than at the transport layer, using Web services standards such as WS-Security and 
WS-Secure Conversation. [16] 
2.7.5 Accounting and audit 
Auditing allows resource providers and solution producers to see what actions were done 
by whom and when. While auditing is not directly a mechanism to secure a system, it is 
nevertheless a vital component in the overall security architecture. [15] It can also ensure 
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that all parties keep to their resource usage agreements. Accounting is a special form of 
auditing where resource and service usage is logged for billing purposes. Like auditing, 
accounting and billing is not a security service itself but a system which has to be secured 
Accounting and audit play important roles in the grid environment.  
2.8 Security Threats classification in Grid 
Although grid security system provides fundamental security mechanisms like 
authentication, authorization, confidentiality also web services provides security systems 
like WS-security, WS-conversations, still there are many other possible security threats 
associated with grid environment. Below security threats classification given in table 1 
are based on the four types of actors associated with grid. [6]  
2.8.1 User Threats  
When user credentials are not secure enough or the fundamental security mechanism like 
authentication or authorization are not carried out properly, there is a chance that 
different user threats will generate. [7] 
2.8.2 Mediator Threats 
During the communication between user and service or resource provider, mediator 
carries the corresponding data or message in XML format. So mediator threat consists of 
those threats originating from insecure service level communication. Insecure 
communication includes eavesdropping and intercepting service communication. 
2.8.3 Service Provider Attack 
The service provider takes the job submitted by the user, process them and send back the 
result to the user with quality-of-service. So service threats are those kinds of threats that 
composed of malicious input to get malicious goal like malicious code/ malware. 
2.8.4 Resource Provider Attack 
A resource provider provides supplies two types of resources including physical 
resources like CPU cycles, storage, bandwidth etc and software resources. So resource 
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provider threats composed of those kinds of threats that are unauthorized use of the 
physical resources or integrity threats or destroying the software resources.  
Table 1: Threats classification in Grid 
 
2.9 Conclusion 
From the possible vulnerability of grid as given in section 2.8, Denial of Service attack 
(DoS) and Distributed Denial of Service attack (DDoS) are immense threats to grid 
computing performance. For example Sun’s new on-demand grid computing service 
becomes a victim with a denial-of-service (DOS) attack on its first day of operation [20]. 
In the next chapter we discussed how DoS and DDoS attack affects grid performance and 
literature survey of some related work to protect grid from denial of service attack. 
User Threats Communication 
Threats 
Service provider 
attack 
Resource provider 
attack 
1.User                   
   credential      
   theft  
 
2.User                           
   credential     
   compromise 
3.User   
   impersonation 
 
1.Network  
   eavesdropping 
2. Man in the    
    middle attack 
3. Replay/session  
    hijack 
4. Brute force attack 
5. Denial of service   
    attack 
6. Sniffing/snooping 
7. Mosque rending 
8. Routing detours 
 
  1.malicious code /    
     malware 
  2.SQL injection 
  3.Access control    
     attack 
  4.Defeating            
     auditing and       
     accounting  
     service 
  5.object reuse 
  6.virus and worms 
  7.dynamic xml 
  8. Improper error     
      Handling 
 
1.Resource and     
   data attack 
2.Improper 
   privilege     
   management 
3.configuration     
    vulnerability 
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3.1 Related Work 
Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) and Denial-of-Service (DoS) are the most dreadful 
network threats in recent years. The vulnerabilities of grid environment in the presence of 
DDoS have been presented in [24] and they have proposed a distributed defense system 
for grid. Authors of [25] discussed the need for an intrusion detection system in grid 
environment. They have classified grid intrusions in to 4 types i.e. 1) Unauthorized 
access 2) Misuse 3) Grid exploit 4) Host or Network-specific attacks. They proposed a 
model that is composed of high-level GIDS (Grid intrusion detection system) that utilizes 
functionality of lower-level HIDS (Host intrusion detection system) and NIDS (Network 
intrusion detection system) provided through standard inter-IDS communication. 
Different techniques and challenges involved in anomaly detection system can be found 
in [28].  Many articles like [27] use traffic volume [flow, packet, byte count] as the 
metric for anomaly detection system. Volume based detection scheme were proved as a 
good metrics for anomaly detection system and  it can detect anomalies that causes large 
traffic changes , but small DoS attacks that do not cause much changes in traffic can not 
be detected perfectly. The attack discussed above can be better detected by analyzing 
distribution of traffic features. A traffic feature is a field in the header of the packet. One 
of the properties of Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) [11] is confidentiality of the data 
transferred over the network. For which the data transmitted over the grid must be 
encrypted. So the system could not see the data payload portion of the packet because of 
encryption. Analysis would be based only on the low level information, which can be 
extracted from the packet header. The Next problem is to find a metric that can extract 
distribution of traffic features that can be used in anomaly detection system. Recently 
there has been use of entropy and traffic distribution for detecting DDoS attack 
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anomalies. A number of articles suggested entropy as a metrics to summarizing traffic 
distribution for anomaly detection [18] [19] [20] [29]. Author [18] uses entropy of 
distribution of source (destination) address for DDoS detection. In [19] included PCA 
framework with entropy based metrics and shown that it can detect wide variety of types 
of anomalies that can not identified using volume based analysis only. In [20] Lee and 
Xiang suggested use of different information theoretic measures for detecting malicious 
activities. The authors of [21] use entropy rate to discriminate the DDoS attack from 
legitimate traffic. The use of entropy for analyze changes in traffic distribution has two 
benefit. i) Using entropy for anomaly detection increases the detection capability than 
volume based methods. ii) It provides additional information to classify among different 
types anomaly (worms, DoS attack. Port scanning) .We considers two classes of 
distribution i) flow header features (IP address, ports, and flow sizes) ii) behavioral 
features (the number of distinct destination / source address that a host communicates 
with) [29]. The anomaly detection system discussed in this paper is based on by 
analyzing the change in entropy of above two traffic distributions. 
Our objective in this paper is to design an anomaly detection system based on 
entropy and entropy rate to detect DDoS attack in grid environment. We use normalized 
entropy which calculates the over all probability distribution in the captured flow in our 
algorithm to get more accurate result. 
3.2 DoS Attack 
A Denial of Service (DOS) is an attack with the intent of compromising availability. A 
DoS attack involves sending large number of unused packets to a particular destination to 
prevent legitimate users from accessing information or services. The attack is aimed at 
shutting down a computer or a network, by exhausting a computer's resource or by 
exhausting bandwidth limits of a network. 
Examples of DoS Attack 
   • Smurf attack. 
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   • Ping flood. 
   • SYN flood. 
   • ICMP flood. 
   • UDP flood. 
3.3 DDoS Attack 
The most common implementation of DoS attack is DDoS attack. The attack is 
distributed because it is a coordinate attack on the availability of given target system or 
network that use the computing power of thousands of compromised machines known as 
“zombies” to a target a victim. A DDoS attack is carried out in several phases. To lunch a 
DDoS attack malicious user first searches for some compromised hosts. This process is 
usually performed automatically through scanning of remote machines, looking for 
security holes. Subsequently the malicious user installs attack tools on the compromised 
host (Zombies). In a typical DDoS attack, Zombies are gathered to send useless service 
requests, packets at the same time. There are four popular known DDoS attack tools:  
 
   • Trinoo  
   • Tribe Flood Network (TFN) 
   • Tfn2k)   
   • Stacheldraht (German for barbed wire) 
DoS or DDoS attacks are not targeted at stealing, modifying or destroying 
information, but its aim is to prevent legitimate users from using a service. It is very 
difficult to detect a DoS attacker because they generally use spoofed IP address and it 
becomes more complicated in large distributed system like grid. Due to the scalability 
and dynamic nature of grid some security flaws are there and the huge resource capacity 
of grid computing may become a next platform for the attackers [24]. If an intruder got 
unauthorized access to grid, then it may pose as an actively participating node in the grid. 
Through message request in the grid application and by using the huge bandwidth the 
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malicious node may use grid network as a massive traffic generator for lunching DDoS 
attack.  
As a secure framework for grid from DDoS attack, the defense system can be 
divided in to 3 steps. (i) Attack prevention (before attack), (ii) attack detection and 
recovery (during the attack), (iii) attack identification (after attack). DoS and DDoS 
scenario has been shown in the figure 3.1. 
 
                                
                Dos Attack                                                                 DDoS Attack 
Figure 3.1:  DoS and DDoS Attack Scenario 
3.4 DDoS Attack Classifications 
We can classify of DDoS attacks into bandwidth depletion and resource depletion attacks 
as shown in the figure 3.2. A bandwidth depletion attack is designed to flood the victim 
network with unwanted traffic so that legitimate traffic will discard. A resource depletion 
attack is designed to tie up the resources of a victim system. This type of attack targets a 
server or process on the victim system making it unable to process legitimate requests for 
service. Flooding attacks which comes under bandwidth depletion is the most possible 
attack in grid computing. Flooding is an attack that is designed to bring a network or 
service down by flooding it with large amounts of traffic.  
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3.5 DDoS Defense Systems 
Denial-Of-Service attacks have become an increasingly prevalent form of security threat, 
and the problem appears to be quite difficult to solve. Several countermeasures have been 
proposed. Based on the DDoS attack detection and defense strategies, we have divided 
complete defense system for DDoS attack into three 3 steps: (i) Attack prevention, (ii) 
attack detection and recovery, and (iii) attack identification.  
3.5.1 DDoS Attack prevention 
The aim of attack prevention mechanisms is to take preventive measures which can not 
provide 100% security, but it will decrease the strength of DDoS attack. Based on the 
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         Figure 3.2: DDoS Attack classification 
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target of implementation of the mechanisms it can divide them in to system security and 
protocol security mechanisms [23]. 
System security mechanisms   
System security deals with those mechanisms which are implemented on the end host. In 
DDoS attack it is required thousands of compromised machines to target a victim, but if 
we will strengthen the overall security of each host of grid then it will difficult for an 
attacker to lunch an attack. Examples of system security mechanisms are firewall and 
micro firewall systems, anti virus systems, access control, packet filter and authorization 
systems. 
Protocol security mechanisms 
Protocol mechanisms increase the security by designing a safe protocol so that only 
resources are allocated to the clients after sufficient authentication and authorization are 
completed. For which resources will not waste time in attack like TCP SYN attack. Use 
of proxy sever has been proposed by authors [31]. 
3.5.2 Attack detection and recovery 
The aim of attack detection and recovery is to detect DDoS attack before it affects the 
end user .Intrusion detection systems [25] are widely used for DDoS detection. An 
Intrusion detection system (IDS) is software and/or hardware which will monitor the 
network or a computer system for suspicious activity and alerts the system manager or 
network administrator. We can classify the IDS based the target of implementation as 
host based and network based. The technique adopted by IDS for intrusion detection 
classifies IDS in to two types signature based and anomaly based.  
Signature based IDS 
A signature based IDS will monitor packets on the network and compare them against a 
database maintained with known threats. If the signature of packets match with those 
known attacks it will marked as malicious. The advantage with signature based IDS is 
signatures are easy to develop. The disadvantage of is that they can only detect known 
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attacks, for which a large up-to-date database of signature for every attack must be 
created. 
Anomaly-based IDS 
Anomaly-based IDS [28] creates the normal behavior of the users using the system or 
network to detect intrusions. If the deviation of user activity is outside a certain threshold 
value, it marked as malicious and a response is triggered. Anomaly detection has an 
advantage over signature-based in that a new attack can be detected if it falls out of the 
normal traffic patterns. Disadvantage of anomaly-detection system is the difficultly of 
defining rules. Setting of a perfect threshold is also very challenging because setting of a 
small threshold creates many false positives and setting of high threshold reduces the 
effectiveness of the IDS [28]. After detection of intrusion it’s the work of response 
system to take action so that attack traffics will damaged with out affecting legitimate 
user. There are popularly two response mechanisms filtering and rate limiting algorithms 
are used against DoS attack. 
3.5.3 Attack Source Identification  
Another difficulty in defending to DDoS attack is to trace the source of the attacks, 
because the attackers are generally uses spoofed IP addresses in the IP packets. For which 
the attack identification mechanism should be flexible enough so that it can trace the 
source of attack packets without depending on the source address field of the IP header. 
There are different mechanisms proposed by different authors like Advanced Marking 
Scheme and the Authenticated Marking Scheme [17], Probabilistic Packet Marking 
(PPM), Deterministic Packet Marking (DPM), has been proposed to trace back the source 
of spoofed IP packets. Also more efficient method like flexible Deterministic Packet 
Marking (FDPM) can be found. [22]  
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3.6 Conclusion 
As pointed in this chapter the performance and QOS (Quality of Service) can be 
adversely if the arising security issues due to DDoS and DDoS attack are not addressed 
properly in time and accurately. In the next chapter we discussed our proposed anomaly 
detection system based on entropy and entropy which can detect Denial of service attack 
with in the network before it affects the victim. 
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4.1 Entropy 
Entropy or Shannon-Wiener index is an important concept of information theory, which 
is a measure of the uncertainty or randomness associated with a random variable or in 
this case data coming over the network. The more random it is, the more entropy it 
contains. The value of sample entropy lies in range [0, logn]. The entropy value is smaller 
when the class distribution is pure i.e. belongs to one class. The entropy value is larger 
when the class distribution is impure i.e. class distribution is more even. Hence 
comparing the value of entropy of some sample of packet header fields to that of another 
sample of packet header fields provides a mechanism for detecting changes in the 
randomness. 
The entropy H (X) of a random variable X with possible values {x1, x2…, xn} and 
distribution of probabilities P = {p1, p2, . . . , pn} with n elements, where 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 and 
∑i pi  = 1 can be calculated as 
H (X) = - ∑
=
n
i 1
P (xi) log P (xi)              (1) 
4.2 Proposed ADS for Grid 
In our proposed anomaly detection algorithm we use entropy as a principal matrix. We 
use change of entropy of traffic distributions (IP address, port) for DDoS detection. If we 
are interested in measuring the entropy of packets over unique source or destination 
address then maximum value of n is 232 for ipv4 address.  If we want to calculate entropy 
over various applications port then n is the maximum number of ports. Here p (xi) where 
xi ∈  X is the probability that X takes the value xi. Suppose we randomly observe X for a 
Chapter   
   4                                                         Entropy Based ADS                 
   DDoS in Grid Environment 
31 
An Anomaly Detection Scheme for DDoS Attack in Grid Computing 
fixed time window w, then p (xi) = mi/m, where mi is the frequency or number of times 
we observe X taking the value xi i.e. m =∑
=
n
i
mi
1
.  
H (X) = - ∑
=
n
i 1
 (mi /m) log (mi /m)                     (2) 
If we want calculate probability of any source (destination) address then, 
mi = number of packets with xi as source (Destination) address and 
m = total number of packets  
           P (xi) =     Number of packets with xi as source (destination) address 
Total number of packets 
Here total number of packets is the number of packets seen for a time window T. 
Similarly we can calculate probability for each source (destination) port as   
     P (xi) =    Number of packets with xi as source (destination) port 
Total number of packets 
Normalized entropy calculates the over all probability distribution in the captured flow 
for the time window T. 
Normalized entropy = (H / log n0)                  (3) 
Here n0   is the number of distinct xi values in the given time window.  
In a DDoS attack from the captured traffic in time window T, the attack flow 
dominates the whole traffic, as a result the normalized entropy of the traffic decreased in 
a detectable manner. But it is also possible in a case of massive legitimate network 
accessing. To confirm the attack we have to again calculate the entropy rate. Here flow is 
packages which share the same destination address/port. In this mechanism we have 
taken one assumption that the attacker uses same function to generate attack packets at 
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“zombies”, and it is a stationary stochastic process. According to [30] for a stochastic 
processes the entropy rate H ( χ ) of two random processes are same.  
H ( χ ) = lim
∞→n n
1 H (x1, x2… xn )                (4) 
The steps in our proposed DDoS detection algorithm are described in figure 4.1. 
 
Algorithm 1 : DDoS detection algorithm 
Step i:   Collect sample flows for a time window T on the   
              edge routers. 
Step ii:  Calculate router entropy H(x) = - ∑
=
n
i 1
P (xi) log         
                     
P (xi). 
Step iii: Calculate NE = (H / log n0) where, NE =             
              normalized router entropy. 
Step iv:  If NE < threshold (δ1), identify the suspected      
              attack flow. 
Step v:  Calculate the entropy rate H ( χ ) = lim
∞→n n
1 H     
              (x1, x2… xn ) of the suspected flow in that router  
              and the routers on down stream. 
Step vi:  Compare Hi ( χ ) ∀ iε  entropy rates on routers. 
Step vii: If Hi ( χ ) ≤  threshold (δ2), it is a DDoS attack. 
                   Else legitimate traffics. 
Step viii: Discard the attack flow.  
 
Figure 4.1: DDoS detection algorithm 
Definition 1 
A stochastic process {X (t), t ∈  T} is a collection of collection of random variables. For 
each t ∈  T, X (t) is a random variable. We refer X (t) as the state of the process at time t. 
The set T is called the index set of process. 
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Definition 2 
A stochastic process is said to be stationary if the joint distribution of any subset of 
random variables is invariant with respect to shifts in the time index i.e. 
Pr{X1 = x1, X2 = x2. . . Xn = xn} 
= Pr{X1+l = x1, X2+l = x2. . . Xn+l = xn} 
Definition 3 
The entropy rate is the rate of growth of entropy of a random process. If we have a 
sequence of n random variables, then the entropy rate of a stochastic process { xi } is 
defined by  
                H ( χ ) = lim
∞→n n
1 H (x1, x2… xn )         
4.3 Implementation Details 
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Figure 4.2: Grid Topology 
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In this section it is described using figure 4.2 how the proposed anomaly detection system 
can be implemented in grid infrastructure and how routers will communicate with each 
other to detect the attack. Grid computing can be thought as a virtual organization which 
is a collection of some real organizations or sites [26]. In the figure 4.2 we have shown a 
grid topology model which is a collection of four sites i.e. site A, site B, site C and site D 
and they are connected by 5 routers. We employ our proposed anomaly detection system 
in each router of the grid infrastructure. Edge routers near the source of traffic will 
capture flows for a predefined time window T and calculate the router entropy and 
normalized router entropy. If the normalized router entropy is less than certain threshold 
δ1 identify the suspected DDoS attack flow from the traffic. But it is also possible in a 
case of massive legitimate network accessing. To confirm the attack the entropy rate of 
the suspected flow is calculated in that router according To “Eq. (4)”. 
Based on the destination address on the IP header of the packets and routing table 
it discovers the downstream routers and sends security alarm to those routers to calculate 
entropy rate of the suspected flow. As discussed above, the entropy rates of attack flows 
at different routers in the network are same. If the calculated entropy rates on routers are 
same or very near, the attack is confirmed. 
We have taken two examples using figure 4.2 how the detection scheme works. 
Suppose node A1 and C4 are attack sources and D1 is the victim. Based on the DDoS 
detection algorithm flows coming A1 will first captured by router 1 and flows coming 
from C4 will be captured by router 3. Suppose at router 1, router 3 and router 2 we have 
captured flows as given in table 2, table 3 and in table 4 respectively in a fixed time 
window T. The router entropy is calculated according to “Eq. (2)”and the normalized 
router entropy is being calculated using “Eq. (3)”.  
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                                                   Table 2. Data for router 1 
Source 
node 
Destination                   
address 
No of
packets 
entropy 
A1 D1 6 0.47 
A5 B5 2 0.44 
A2 B2 3 0.51 
Here router entropy = 0.47 + 0.44 + 0.51 = 1.42 and n0 =   3 
Normalized router entropy NE = 1.42/ log2 3 = 0.89 
                                                     Table 3. Data for router 3 
Source 
node 
Destination 
node 
No of 
packets 
entropy 
C1 B4 2 0.48 
C2 D3 2 0.48 
C4 D1 5 0.47 
 
Here Router entropy =0.47+0.48+0.48 = 1.43 and  n0 =   3 
Normalized Router entropy NE = 1.43/ log2 3 = 0.90 
 
Table 4. Data for router 2 
Source 
node 
Destination  
node 
No of 
packets 
entropy 
B1 C2 2 0.52 
B2 C3 2 0.52 
B3 C1 2 0.52 
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Here Router entropy=0.52 + 0.52 +0.52 = 1.56 and  n0 =   3 
Normalized Router entropy NE = 1.56/ log2 3 = 0.98 
Although the data are taken manually we can see that for router 1 and router 3 the 
normalized router entropy is comparatively less than the router 2. In the first two cases 
one flow dominates the whole traffic as a result the normalized entropy decreases. If the 
threshold δ1 is perfect, suppose 0.94 for the above example, it will treat flow coming 
from node A1 and C4 as suspected flows. After which the entropy rate is being 
calculated. In figure 4.2, for router 1 the entropy rate of suspected flow is calculated and 
compared in router1 and router 0. Similarly for router 3 the entropy rate of those flows 
will be calculated and compared both in router 3 and router 0. While the entropy rates of 
different routers are same or less than δ2, the attack is confirmed and attack flow is 
discarded. All the above calculations are based on log2. 
4.4 Conclusion        
In this chapter we have described about our proposed entropy based anomaly detection 
algorithm. In the next chapter we are going to evaluate the performance of this algorithm 
using NS2 network simulator 
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The simulation was done using NS-2 simulator [10] to evaluate the performance of our 
DDoS detection algorithm with results from the experiment. We tested our anomaly 
detection algorithm on a 3.0GHz processor, in linux (Ubuntu 8.04) environment. This 
section introduces the experimental setup and reports performance results. 
5.1 Experimental setup 
Our simulation includes 3 source, 2 intermediate routers and 2 destination nodes as 
shown in figure 5.1. Out of which 3 source nodes 2 nodes are attackers and 1 node is a 
legitimate user. The bandwidth of legitimate traffic is set constant and the simulation of 
attack traffic is achieved by randomly generating many pairs of Constant Bit Rate (CBR) 
UDP flows in NS2. The legitimate user to send packets from the time of .20 second and 
the attacker starts sending attack traffic at .30 seconds. The experiment lasts at 3 second. 
We traced no of packets received in every 0.5 second interval. In table 5 the traced data 
are shown. 
 
Figure 5.1: Screen shot of Setup 
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Table 5: Traced Data 
Time in second Number of attack 
packet received 
Number of 
legitimate packet 
received 
           0-0.5 106 47 
0.5-1.0 268 25 
1.0-1.5 266 49 
1.5-2.0 266 31 
2.0-2.5 268 134 
2.5-3.0 266 133 
Table 6: Normalized Router Entropy Calculations 
Time in Second Normalized Router Entropy 
0-0.5 0.8899 
0.5-1.0 0.4207 
1.0-1.5 0.6235 
1.5-2.0 0.4825 
2.0-2.5 0.9183 
2.5-3.0 0.9183 
 
5.2 Performance Evaluation 
We consider 2 situations in our simulation to evaluate the performance of our proposed 
algorithm. In the first situation, we start the attack without using any defense mechanism 
and study how the system performance is being degraded. In this case the router at the 
victim simply drops packets including legitimate packets which it can not handle. In the 
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second situation, we deploy the entropy based anomaly detection system in the 
simulation network and examine how the system performance increases significantly. 
The graph in Figure 5.2 depicts the effect of DDoS attack without any defense 
system. It shows numbers of attack packets as well as legitimate packets with respect to 
time. We can mark that with in same time different zombies combined to send attack 
packets as a result the number of attack packets increases significantly. For which the 
packet drop rate of legitimate users increases dramatically as shown in the Figure 5.3.  
 
Figure 5.2: Effect of DDoS Attack 
 
Figure 5.3: Screen shot of packet drop 
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We use 2 metrics attack detection rate and false-positive rate as performance evaluation 
metrics. 
1)   Detection Rate  
 
Rd =   d / n  
         d = number of attack packet detected in the simulation experiments. 
         n =   total number of attack packet generated. 
The figure 5.4 shows attack detection rate of our proposed algorithm with respect to 
detection threshold. We found that the attack detection rate detection is almost 100% 
when the detection threshold δ1 i.e normalized entropy is more than 0.92. But after 
calculating the false positive rate we will finalize the threshold δ1 in this experiment. 
 
Figure 5.4: DDoS attack Detection Rate 
2)  False positive Rate Rfp = p / m 
         P = number of false positive raised 
         m = number of legitimate traffic flow checked by the simulator 
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When calculating false positive rate we found that up to setting detection threshold 0.94 
the false positive rate is 0, but putting threshold 0.95-0.99 increases false positive rate 
67.26 and after then false positive rate 100%.as shown in figure 12. 
 
Figure 12: False Positive Rate 
5.3 Conclusion 
According to the obtained simulation results, if we will take the detection threshold δ1 as 
0.94 then, the proposed anomaly detection system can detect DDoS attack traffics with 
100% detection rate and with out any false positive. If the normalized router entropy in 
any case will be less than 0.94 it starts detecting the suspected flow. Again entropy rate is 
being calculated according to the DDoS detection algorithm given in section 4.2 to 
confirm the attack.  
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This thesis takes a look at different vulnerability associated with grid. Out of which 
Distributed Denial of Service is an immense thereat to grid services. We found that 
applying IDS to it can significantly increase its security which can deploy along with 
existing security measures. But existing IDSs are not designed to be grid specific. The 
objective of this study was to investigate how DDoS attack affects the grid 
performance and designing a grid specific anomaly detection system. DDoS attack is 
a major threat that can not be addressed well if various defense systems do not 
organize in to framework exchanging information and services. For which we have 
divided DDoS defense system in to 3 steps (i) Attack prevention (before attack), (ii) 
attack detection and recovery (during the attack), (iii) attack identification (after 
attack). 
 The attack must be detected and blocked before reaching the victim and with 
high detection rate and low false alarm rate. In this paper we have used information 
theoretic parameters entropy and entropy rate to model the anomaly detection system 
for grid. We have implemented anomaly detection system in each router of the grid 
environment and the router will cooperate with each other to detect anomaly. The 
main advantage of the above proposed method is the attack is detected and blocked 
before reaching the victim and with high detection rate. But the challenge lies in this 
approach if the attacker will use different packet generation functions in an attack and 
setting a good threshold. 
Our experiment results also shows that if the threshold setting is perfect our 
proposed entropy based ADS can efficiently detect DoS and DDoS attack with a high 
detection and low false positive rate. 
 
 
 
                                                               Conclusion 
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The main challenge lies in our proposed anomaly detection system are: 
1) Discriminating legitimate traffics when there is a large number of legitimate 
accessing to a particular server. 
2) Generally attacker uses same attack generation function to create attack 
packets at compromise hosts or zombies, but if attacker starts generating 
attack packets using different attack packet generation function. 
3) Setting up a good threshold Value is very difficult and that should be dynamic 
depending up on the current situation. 
 
As a next step we are going to work to eliminate those above issues and apart from 
DDoS attack, there are many other security threats possible on grid and in near future 
we will work more security issues. 
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